The Future of Privacy in a Unified National Health Information Infrastructure by McMahon, Dennis J.
MCMAHON_FINALV2 4/11/2008 10:59:23 AM 
 
787 
 
THE FUTURE OF PRIVACY IN A UNIFIED NATIONAL 
HEALTH INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
Dennis J. McMahon∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990s, the federal government has set its sights 
on enacting legislation to establish a national infrastructure for the 
storage and transmission of electronic health records.1  In 1996, Con-
gress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) to protect individuals from abuse by health insurance com-
panies and to provide a “floor” of mandatory privacy standards for 
certain healthcare entities.2  HIPAA, as well as other federal privacy 
protections, however, has become antiquated and inadequate.3  Thus, 
members of Congress are currently considering an array of bills in-
tended to regulate the use of medical information by the healthcare 
industry.4
The federal government’s current approach to increasing effi-
ciency in healthcare, while lowering its cost by creating a national 
electronic health information infrastructure, will significantly impact 
personal privacy and the ability to secure such information.5  It is im-
perative, therefore, that this legislation include provisions that safe-
guard personal privacy and protect confidential information from po-
tential third-party abuse. 
 ∗ J.D. candidate, 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S.M.E., 2005, Vil-
lanova University. 
 1 See United States Health Service Act, H.R. 2061, 103d Cong. (1993) (establish-
ing a United States Health Service to coordinate state and local healthcare entities); 
H.R. 1534, 102d Cong. (1991) (requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices to study national healthcare systems of other developed countries and to make 
recommendations for legislation based on its findings to improve healthcare in the 
U.S.); National Health Care and Cost Containment Act, H.R. 2530, 102d Cong. 
(1991) (granting financial and other incentives to assist and encourage creation of a 
universal healthcare system). 
 2 See infra Part II.E. 
 3 See infra Part II.B–E. 
 4 See infra Part III. 
 5 Id. 
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Along with the benefits of a unified, national healthcare infra-
structure come the problems associated with increased access to 
health records and electronically stored information.6  That various 
institutions have incentives to misappropriate medical information 
augments the need for a solution.7  There are, however, several 
methods of privacy protection available to eliminate, or at least miti-
gate, the negative effects on information privacy and security that a 
national healthcare infrastructure will engender.8
This Comment begins with an overview of the current state of 
healthcare privacy law and the need for adequate privacy protection.  
Part III then describes and analyzes selected bills which are paradig-
matic of the various approaches that Congress currently contem-
plates.  Part IV examines different methods of privacy protection 
available to supplement these bills.  Part IV also argues that the most 
effective way to protect personal privacy in a national health informa-
tion infrastructure is through a multi-layered approach which utilizes 
a new property right in personal information along with contractual 
and tort-based protection. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. A Need for Privacy 
As health information has become increasingly computerized, 
the risks associated with misappropriation are heightened.  The elec-
tronic storage and transmission of health information creates oppor-
tunities for such information to be accidentally or intentionally dis-
closed to the wrong people.9  Moreover, the consequences of 
misappropriation are especially severe within the realm of health-
related information.10
Transmission of health information through the Internet allows 
“information to be transmitted anywhere in the world quickly, 
 6 See infra Part II.A. 
 7 Id. 
 8 See infra Part IV. 
 9 Sonia W. Nath, Relief for the E-Patient? Legislative and Judicial Remedies to Fill 
HIPAA’s Privacy Gaps, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 530 (2006). 
 10 Protection of health records is especially important because of the personal 
nature of the information they contain as well as the importance of health record 
integrity. See Errors Across the Internet, CONSUMER REPORTS.ORG, Mar. 2006, http://www. 
consumerreports.org/cro/health-fitness/health-care/electronic-medical-records-306 
/errors-across-the-internet/index.htm; Safeguarding Against Theft, CONSUMERREPORTS 
.ORG, Mar. 2006, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/health-fitness/health-care/ 
electronic-medical-records-306/safeguarding-against-theft/index.htm. 
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cheaply, and with relatively little risk of detection.”11  Moreover, elec-
tronic health records have the ability to contain vast amounts of sen-
sitive information.12  Additionally, it can be difficult to permanently 
delete information from a hard drive, leaving many files available for 
misappropriation, despite a healthcare entity’s best efforts to destroy 
personal information.13  Many computer programs store information 
in hidden files, which can contain large amounts of confidential in-
formation and can be misappropriated.14  There are also risks associ-
ated with employees’ authorized access to such information.  Some 
privacy experts believe that the most critical risks to healthcare in-
formation are disgruntled employees and social engineering.15  Fur-
ther, when electronic data is divulged online, it is difficult to remove 
and becomes available to anyone.16  Individuals that have been 
harmed by such disclosure may have little recourse, since it can be 
difficult to ascertain which party is responsible for the disclosure.17
There have been too many examples of health information pri-
vacy being compromised over the last few years.  In 2001, a security 
breach caused Eli Lilly & Co. to distribute emails containing the 
email addresses of 699 users of Prozac, an anti-depressant manufac-
tured by the company.18   In 2005, approximately ten million records 
were reported missing between February and June alone.19  In Janu-
 11 Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protect-
ing the Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 332 (2007). 
 12 Mitchelle C. Pierre, New Technology, Old Issues: The All-Digital Hospital and Medi-
cal Information Privacy, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 541, 547 (2004)  (“Patient medical records 
have come to include more sensitive information such as HIV status, psychiatric re-
cords, lifestyle details, and genetic information.”). 
 13 See John R. Mallery, Secure File Deletion: Fact or Fiction?, SANS INSTITUTE, July 16, 
2001, http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/incident/631.php?portal=5 
e905d2d4abce38f2e1de8f3f10812c6. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See Malcom Allen, Social Engineering: A Means to Violate a Computer System, SANS 
INSTITUTE, June 2006, http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/engineeri 
ng/529.php?portal=4b978ba268574768302191032cc4a58f.  Social engineering has 
been defined as “[a] euphemism for non-technical or low-technology means—such 
as lies, impersonation, tricks, bribes, blackmail, and threats—used to attack informa-
tion systems.”  Id. at 4. 
 16 Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 335. 
 17 Id. 
 18 News Release, Federal Trade Comm’n, Eli Lilly Settles FTC Charges Concern-
ing Security Breach, (Jan. 18, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/ 
01/elililly.htm. 
 19 Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 332. 
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ary 2006, hackers gained access to a Notre Dame database.20  In April 
2006, a man was arrested for hacking into a University of Southern 
California database and accessing the records of over 270,000 appli-
cants.21  In May 2006, hackers misappropriated the health and finan-
cial information of 200,000 individuals from an Ohio University data-
base.22  Many pharmaceutical companies do not “review[] the 
effectiveness of their security policies and procedures” and only 
eighty-two percent of pharmaceutical companies reported feeling 
confident in their ability to protect private information.23  Further, 
according to one survey, eighty-four percent of all large businesses in 
the United Kingdom experienced premeditated and malicious secu-
rity breaches in 2006.24
Arguably, however, the most severe threats to health information 
privacy come from private business entities.  Personal health informa-
tion may be used by employers to hire only healthy employees and 
thereby reduce insurance costs; by banks to ensure repayment of 
loans; by drug companies seeking to target individuals and doctors 
for marketing products; and by health insurance companies for set-
ting insurance premiums.25  Correspondingly, studies have shown 
that between thirty-five and fifty percent of America’s largest compa-
nies use personal health records to make employment decisions.26  
Consequently, the data mining and warehousing industry has flour-
ished since the early 1990s, amassing astronomically vast amounts of 
 20 Greg Sandoval, Notre Dame Probes Hack of Computer System, CNETNEWS.COM, Jan. 
23, 2006, http://news.com.com/Notre+Dame+probes+hack+of+computer+system/ 
2100-1029_3-6030229.html?tag=st.rn. 
 21 Stefanie Olsen, Man Charged with Hacking USC Database, CNETNEWS.COM, Apr. 
20, 2006, http://news.com.com/Man+charged+with+hacking+USC+database/2100-
7350_3-6063470.html?tag=st.rn. 
 22 Greg Sandoval, Ohio University Suffers Security Breaches, CNETNEWS.COM, May 11, 
2006, http://news.com.com/2100-7349_3-6071505.html. 
 23 PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, THE 2004 GLOBAL INFORMATION SECURITY SURVEY 
(2005) available at http://www.biznespolska.pl/files/reports/Pharma%20Alert_ 
Dec%202004%20_Security%20Survey_v7.pdf. 
 24 PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, INFORMATION 
SECURITY BREACHES SURVEY 2006 (2006) available at http://www.pwc.com/uk/eng/ 
ins-sol/publ/pwc_dti-fullsurveyresults_execsum06.pdf. 
 25 Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 334. 
 26 See Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t. Mgmt., Info., & Tech. of the H. Comm. 
on Gov’t. Reform & Oversight, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Janlori Goldman, Di-
rector, Health Privacy Project, Institute for Health Care Research and Policy, 
Georgetown University) (stating that thirty-five percent of Fortune 500 companies 
use health information in employment decisions); see also ROSS J. ANDERSON, SECURITY 
IN CLINICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 5 (British Medical Association) (1996) available at 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/policy11.pdf. 
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personal information.27  Currently, over one thousand data mining 
and warehousing companies are collecting the personal information 
of American consumers.28  Moreover, these companies keep informa-
tion on virtually every household; some claiming to have amassed 
over one thousand pieces of data on the average household.29  Simi-
larly, a company known as the Medical Information Bureau (MIB) 
amasses personal health information about almost everyone obtain-
ing, or attempting to obtain, health insurance.30  Insurance compa-
nies typically gather this information when an individual applies for 
health insurance and then report it to the MIB in a series of codes.31  
Although the MIB keeps its list of codes secret, researchers claim that 
the MIB uses hundreds of codes to describe information including 
AIDS, diabetes, heart problems, drug use, smoking, adverse driving 
records, hazardous sports, sexual deviance, and sloppy appearance.32  
Subsequently, when an individual applies for insurance with another 
insurance company, this information is used to deny coverage or to 
raise premiums.33  Unfortunately, HIPAA does not protect this infor-
mation because the MIB codes are not considered protected health 
information.34
Increased consumer awareness of the potential harm caused by 
misuse of personal information has led to inefficiency in healthcare.  
Physicians depend on patients to provide truthful and complete in-
formation.35  As one commentator noted, “[i]f patients have concerns 
about the privacy of their health information, they are less likely to 
divulge pertinent information for fear of inappropriate disclosures, 
which could result in inappropriate or incorrect treatment.”36  In fact, 
a recent National Consumer Health Privacy survey showed that sixty-
seven percent of the population is “somewhat” to “very” concerned 
 27 Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of the 
Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 
2 (2003). 
 28 Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response 
to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2003). 
 29 Id. at 65–66. 
 30 See Simson Garfinkel, Nobody Knows the MIB, in INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 348–
50 (2006). 
 31 See id.; see also Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Fact Sheet 8: Medical Records Pri-
vacy, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs8-med.htm#C (last visited Oct. 22, 2007). 
 32 See Garfinkel, supra note 30, at 349. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 31.  The MIB, however, is a con-
sumer reporting agency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  Id. 
 35 Nath, supra note 9, at 530–31. 
 36 Id. at 531. 
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about medical record confidentiality.37  Additionally, thirteen percent 
admitted to avoiding disclosure to medical practitioners in some way 
to protect their information.38  Similarly, a study by the American 
Health Information Management Association showed that thirty per-
cent of healthcare providers reported an increase in patients who ask 
questions about privacy concerns, while twenty-two percent have re-
ported an increase in the number of patients who refuse to sign re-
lease of information forms.39  Therefore, the current lack of adequate 
privacy protection frustrates the goal of increasing the quality of 
healthcare.40  Creating a national health information infrastructure 
will only augment the loss of privacy associated with the increase in 
health information technology.41
B. Constitutional Protection 
The Bill of Rights provided the earliest and most basic privacy 
protection for American citizens.42  Although the Framers of the Con-
stitution arguably could not have envisioned the stark increase in 
technology—along with the increase in the complexity of daily life 
which has given rise to a need for information privacy protection—
the Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the Constitu-
tion to include a right of privacy in one’s personal information.43  As 
applied to private health information, however, the right has a very 
narrow scope and is limited to provide inadequate privacy protection 
for confidential medical information.44
The Supreme Court first articulated a fundamental right to pri-
vacy in Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford.45  There, the Court held that a 
 37 Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 335 (citing LYNNE BISHOP ET AL., 
CALIFORNIA HEALTH CARE FOUNDATION, NATIONAL CONSUMER HEALTH PRIVACY SURVEY 
2005: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2005)). 
 38 Id.  (“Furthermore, thirteen percent of respondents claimed that they had at-
tempted to protect their own privacy by avoiding medical tests or visits to their regu-
lar physicians, asking doctors to distort diagnoses, or paying for tests out-of-pocket so 
that no medical documentation would be sent to insurance companies.”). 
 39 AMERICAN HEALTH INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, THE STATE OF 
HIPAA PRIVACY AND SECURITY COMPLIANCE 12–14 (April 2006). 
 40 Nath, supra note 9, at 531. 
 41 See Pierre, supra note 12, at 547–48. 
 42 See U.S. CONST. amends. I, III, IV, V, IX; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965). 
 43 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–602 nn.23–24 (1977).  Although the Court 
held that there was no constitutional privacy violation in the statute, it provided ex-
amples of different types of constitutional privacy protection for information and ex-
plained that the scope of privacy protection is unclear.  Id. 
 44 See infra notes 52–69 and accompanying text. 
 45 141 U.S. 250 (1891). 
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plaintiff could not be compelled to undergo a surgical examination 
in a civil action.46  The Court described a “sacred” right of privacy 
that must be “carefully guarded.”47  Moreover, in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,48 the Supreme Court interpreted the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
and Ninth Amendments as incidents of the Bill of Rights protecting a 
greater, fundamental concept of a right to privacy.49  Subsequently, 
the Court considerably expanded this right when it applied the fun-
damental right to privacy under various circumstances.50  Beginning 
in the late 1970s, however, a judicial trend emerged to limit the scope 
of constitutional privacy protection specifically pertaining to medical 
information.51
Whalen v. Roe52 was the first major case limiting constitutional 
protection for private medical information.53  Whalen involved a con-
troversial New York law which required detailed information regard-
ing patients who received Schedule II prescription drugs54 to be 
stored in a government database.55  The Court identified two catego-
ries of personal privacy violations: “disclosure of personal matters” 
and preventing “independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions.”56  Further, the Court acknowledged the danger and nega-
tive consequences associated with maintaining a database of confi-
dential medical records.57  Nevertheless, the Court determined that 
the threat posed by the law did not meet the threshold of severity 
necessary to be violative of the Constitution.58  Thus, the scope of 
 46 Id. at 255. 
 47 Id. at 251. 
 48 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 49 Id. at 484–85. 
 50 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating a state law pro-
hibiting sodomy between same-sex couples); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (hold-
ing a state law prohibiting abortion invalid for interfering with a constitutional right 
to privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (expanding the fundamental 
right to privacy in the use of contraceptive devices found in Griswold v. Connecticut to 
protect non-married individuals). 
 51 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603–07 (1977). 
 52 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 53 Id. at 598–605. 
 54 New York State law classifies the most dangerous prescription drugs as Sched-
ule II prescription drugs.  Id. at 593 & n.8.  These drugs have legitimate medical pur-
poses but are highly likely to be abused.  Id. 
 55 Id. at 593. 
 56 Id. at 598–600. 
 57 Id. at 604–07. 
 58 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04.  Although the Court did not explicitly state the 
level of severity needed to implicate a violation of constitutional privacy protection, it 
noted that “neither the immediate nor the threatened impact . . . on either the repu-
tation or the independence of patients . . . is sufficient to constitute an invasion of 
MCMAHON_FINALV2 4/11/2008  10:59:23 AM 
794 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:787 
 
constitutional protection for medical information privacy was unclear 
after Whalen.  Although the Court did not eliminate the possibility 
that a constitutional cause of action would lie, it set a high threshold 
for success on such a claim.59
In Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,60 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, confronting what many 
would consider an egregious misappropriation and disclosure of per-
sonal information,61 further restricted the role of the Constitution in 
protecting health information privacy.62  In that case, a state em-
ployer discovered an employee’s status as an AIDS patient by viewing 
prescription drug records provided pursuant to a health insurance 
agreement.63  Thereafter, the employer disclosed this information to 
other employees.64  The plaintiff, known as Doe, consequently sued 
the employer, alleging that the employer violated his constitutional 
right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment.65  The court used 
a seven-factor test, first articulated in United States v. Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corp.,66 to determine whether the interest in reducing the cost of 
health insurance and preventing fraud outweighed the invasion of 
Doe’s personal privacy.67  Moreover, the court noted that the distin-
guishing factor between this case and prior cases, in which the privacy 
any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id.  Concurring, Jus-
tice Brennan stated that the “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” is 
not “seriously enough invaded” in this case because the State limited the number of 
people with access to this information and put restrictions on disclosure.  Id. at 606 
(Brennan, J., concurring).  However, Justice Brennan noted that new computer 
technology “vastly increase[s] the potential for abuse of that information,” and that 
in the future there may be a need to “curb . . . such technology.”  Id. at 607. 
 59 See id. at 603–07 (majority opinion). 
 60 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 61 See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for In-
formation Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1438–39 (2001). 
 62 Doe, 72 F.3d 1133. 
 63 Id. at 1135–36. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 1137–38. 
 66 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 67 Doe, 72 F.3d at 1140 (citing Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578).   
Westinghouse mandates a consideration of seven different factors. They 
are: (1) the type of record requested; (2) the information it does or 
might contain; (3) the potential for harm in any subsequent noncon-
sensual disclosure; (4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in 
which the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to pre-
vent unauthorized disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access; and 
(7) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public 
policy, or other recognizable public interest favoring access. 
Id. 
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interest prevailed, was the lack of harm caused by collecting and us-
ing Doe’s data.68  However, this decision ignores serious intangible 
and psychological harm in favor of a mild state interest.69
In the wake of these cases, it is apparent that constitutional pri-
vacy protection is too limited to adequately handle the privacy risks 
associated with a unified national health information infrastructure.  
First, the courts have failed to conceptualize the potential scope of 
the harm caused by breaches of privacy in health information.70  The 
court in Doe did not understand that “[Doe’s] real injury was the 
powerlessness of having no idea who else knew he had HIV, what his 
employer thought of him, or how the information could be used 
against him. . . . [T]he information appeared to be entirely out of 
anyone’s control.”71  Second, the courts have not accurately realized 
the range of security risks posed by electronic storage of health in-
formation.  This is evident from the Whalen Court’s pronouncement 
that disclosure of medical information can occur in only three ways: 
through(1) either deliberate or negligent employee action, (2) evi-
dence in a judicial proceeding, or (3) voluntary disclosure.72  Obvi-
ously, in a national infrastructure of databases that transmits informa-
tion electronically to doctors, insurance companies, patients, and 
other medical staff, there are many ways in which personal data may 
be misappropriated.  The failure to grasp both the nature of the 
harm caused by a breach of privacy and the methods by which data 
can be misappropriated has caused lower courts to adopt tests for 
constitutional privacy violations that reduce the weight given to pri-
vacy concerns in favor of marginally legitimate state interests in ob-
taining information.73
C. State and Common Law Information Privacy Protection 
State and common law privacy protection is inadequate because, 
in addition to varying between states, it tends to focus on physician-
patient confidentiality, which can only cover a small portion of the 
 68 Doe, 72 F.3d at 1140–43. 
 69 See Solove, supra note 61, at 1438. 
 70 See id. 
 71 Id. at 1438–39. 
 72 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977).  Although the Court was specifi-
cally addressing privacy concerns regarding the New York statute at issue in this case, 
the Court stated generally that “[p]ublic disclosure of patient information can come 
about in three ways.”  Id. 
 73 Pierre, supra note 12, at 564. 
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threats to data in a national health information infrastructure.74  
Since actions which allege breaches of confidentiality are typically 
only successful if they also allege a fiduciary relationship between a 
doctor and a patient, such actions cannot be brought against many 
third-party practitioners or entities who interact with or maintain pa-
tient information.75  Yet these entities are equally capable of divulging 
private medical information and can be entirely out of the reach of 
traditional tort law.  As one commentator points out, because the 
health record itself contains information collected by several primary 
and secondary sources, “[f]ocusing legal protection on a single 
therapeutic relationship within this information environment is an 
anachronistic vestige of an earlier and simpler time in medicine.”76  
Thus, the current scheme of common law tort protection will not sa-
tiate the need for adequate privacy protection in a national health-
care information infrastructure.77
D. The Privacy Act of 1974 
Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974 (“Privacy Act”) in re-
sponse to growing public concern over government agencies using 
electronic means to amass large databases that contain personal in-
formation.78  The Privacy Act aimed to abate these concerns by allow-
ing individuals to access and control records stored by the federal 
government and by limiting the government’s ability to use and dis-
close private information.79  This attempt at omnibus legislation, 
which requires government compliance with fair information prac-
tices, is incapable of sufficiently protecting individuals’ health infor-
mation in a national healthcare information infrastructure.80
  74 See JOY PRITTS ET AL., THE STATE OF HEALTH PRIVACY (Georgetown University 2d 
ed. 2002)(1999)(surveying and comparing various state privacy laws) available at 
http://medicalrecordrights.georgetown.edu/pdfs/statereport1.pdf; see also Law-
rence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 511–12 (1995). 
 75 Gostin, supra note 74, at 512.  Third-party practitioners and entities could in-
clude nurses, medical testing facilities, medical testing technicians, or other agents 
and employees of a healthcare entity who do not interact directly with the patient.  
Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Nationalization of Health Information Privacy Protec-
tions, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 283, 293 (2002). 
 78 JOINT COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 
1974: SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY 1–9 (1976). 
 79 Id. at 161–62 (containing the code of fair information practices, which lists the 
eight principles which guided the creation of the privacy act). 
 80 See infra notes 81–89 and accompanying text. 
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The protection afforded by the Privacy Act is insufficient since it 
applies only to federal agencies.81  The Privacy Act does not offer pro-
tection to individuals from abuse by private sector entities or from 
government entities at the state level.82  This boundary of Privacy Act 
protection renders it ineffective in protecting health information in a 
healthcare regime dominated by private industry.83  Moreover, the 
Privacy Act has often been criticized because it allows federal agencies 
to hire private database companies to compile, use, and disclose con-
fidential information in ways that would violate the Privacy Act if car-
ried out by a federal agency.84  Because it regulates only federal agen-
cies, the Privacy Act shifts federal privacy abuses to the private sector, 
where there is no privacy regulation.  Thus, the protection offered by 
the Privacy Act is minimal in a uniform national health information 
infrastructure. 
Additionally, the Privacy Act is insufficient because it includes 
many exceptions to its regulations that have been abused and treated 
as loopholes.  Perhaps the most glaring loophole in the Privacy Act is 
the “Routine Use” exception.85  This exception allows federal agen-
cies to disclose personal information if they determine that the dis-
closure is part of the routine use of information and it is compatible 
with the original purpose for collecting the information.86  This 
grants the agency broad discretion to make its own determination re-
garding the purpose for collecting information and whether the dis-
closure is compatible with such a purpose.87
Another exception allows a federal agency to transfer informa-
tion to another federal agency upon the written request of the receiv-
ing agency.88  Further, federal agencies are aided in avoiding the Pri-
 81 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(f)(1), 552a(a)(1) (2000). 
 82 See id. 
 83 Pierre, supra note 12, at 554–55. 
 84 Chris J. Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How Choicepoint and Other Commer-
cial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COMM. REG. 595, 622–23 (2004).  The Privacy Act mandates that a private agency 
hired by contract by a federal agency will be treated as an employee of the federal 
agency and will be subject to the requirements of the Privacy Act.  5 U.S.C. § 
552a(m)(1) (2000).  However, the Act specifically exempts a consumer reporting 
agency from being considered a contractor under this section, and thus, from the 
requirements of the Privacy Act.  Id. § 552a(m)(2). 
 85 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3). 
 86 Id. 
 87 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION 
PRIVACY LAW 583–86 (2d ed. 2006). 
 88 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7). 
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vacy Act by its vague language and lack of legislative history.89  Conse-
quently, the Privacy Act cannot be relied upon to protect private 
medical information. 
E. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
In 1996, Congress passed HIPAA90 to prevent insurance compa-
nies and healthcare providers from abusing the privacy of patients.91  
In its final form, HIPPA includes privacy and security regulations, 
which attempt to control the use and transmission of heath informa-
tion.92  These regulations were meant to establish national minimum 
standards for health information privacy.93  Thus, HIPAA establishes a 
floor for health information privacy but does not preempt stronger 
state protection.94  Nevertheless, more adequate standards must be 
implemented because there are several deficiencies in the HIPAA 
privacy and security rules.95
HIPAA required Congress to pass privacy legislation by 1999 as 
part of its Administrative Simplification provisions.96  However, Con-
gress did not carry out this obligation, and the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) created its own privacy regulations pur-
suant to HIPAA97 in 2000, known as the Privacy Rule.98  Thereafter, 
HHS received a deluge of comments from the public regarding the 
complexity of the Privacy Rule, problems with its consent require-
ment, and the cost of implementing the regulations.99  Consequently, 
 89 Haeji Hong, Dismantling the Private Enforcement of the Privacy Act of 1974: Doe v. 
Chao, 38 AKRON L. REV. 71, 86 (2005). 
 90 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 91 H.R. REP. NO. 104-496, at 69–70 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 
1868–69. 
 92 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101–164.534 (2007). 
 93 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 82462, 82471 (Dec. 28, 2000). 
 94 Id. 
 95 See infra Part II.E. 
 96 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, Title II, Subtitle F, §§ 261–264, 110 Stat. 2033.  The Administrative Simplifica-
tion provisions are a portion of HIPAA that were implemented to establish “a na-
tional health care fraud and abuse control program.”  H.R. REP. NO. 104-496, at 67 
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1866. 
 97 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d to -8 (2000). 
 98 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. at 82462. 
 99 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 53182, 53183, 53209 (Aug. 18, 2002).  The consent requirement required cov-
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in March 2001, HHS amended the Privacy Rule and allowed the pub-
lic to comment on proposed regulations.100  After much debate, the 
Final Privacy Rule was promulgated in August 2002.101  The Final Pri-
vacy Rule has been criticized for, among other things, its lack of con-
sent requirements that were incorporated in the initial Privacy Rule 
and for its use of confusing and vague language.102
The Final Privacy Rule applies to certain “covered entities,” 
which include health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and health-
care providers.103  A “health plan” is a group or individual plan pro-
viding or paying for medical care.104  A “health care clearinghouse” is 
an entity that processes medical information.105  Finally, a “health 
care provider” is an entity that provides “medical or health services” 
or an entity that “furnishes, bills, or is paid for healthcare in the 
normal course of business.”106  Moreover, certain “hybrid entities” 
must comply with HIPAA regulations.107  A hybrid entity is one that 
provides healthcare services in addition to several other services.108  
These hybrid entities must comply with the regulations only to the 
extent that they deal with medical information.109  Thus, HIPAA pro-
tection for medical information applies only to healthcare clearing-
houses, healthcare providers, healthcare plans, and to a lesser de-
gree, hybrid entities. 
HIPAA privacy regulations apply to all types of “individually 
identifiable health information,” in both electronic and paper 
form.110  Individually identifiable information includes information 
that is created or received by a covered entity and is related to the 
physical or mental condition of an individual, the “provision of 
health care to an individual,” or the payment for healthcare.111  The 
information must either identify an individual or be reasonably trace-
able to an individual.112  Individually identifiable information can be 
ered entities to get the patient’s consent before disclosing protected health informa-
tion for certain uses.  See id. at 53209. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 53182. 
 102 See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11. 
 103 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2007). 
 104 Id. § 160.103. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. § 164.504. 
 108 Id. 
 109 45 C.F.R. § 160.504. 
 110 Id. § 160.103. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
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“de-identified,” and thus, is not subject to the HIPAA regulations.113  
The definitions for individually identifiable information can be very 
confusing, and there is little supplemental information guiding cov-
ered entities in distinguishing non-identifiable information from in-
dividually identifiable information.114
HIPAA attempts to safeguard privacy by regulating the circum-
stances under which individually identifiable information may be 
used and transmitted.  HIPAA allows covered entities to disclose pro-
tected health information, without the individual’s authorization, to 
the individual, or for treatment, payment, and healthcare opera-
tions.115  For other disclosures, authorization by the individual is re-
quired.116  Disclosures requiring authorization include disclosures for 
marketing purposes,117 disclosure to an employer,118 and fundrais-
ing.119  Moreover, any use of psychotherapy notes requires authoriza-
tion by the individual.120  In the event of a disclosure, the covered en-
tity must also reasonably limit the information disclosed to the 
minimum amount necessary.121
Additionally, the Final Privacy Rule includes the HIPAA Security 
Rule.122  The Security Rule mandates that covered entities implement 
safeguards to protect individually identifiable information transmit-
ted or maintained electronically.123  The Security Rule is based on 
 113 Id. § 164.502(d)(2). 
 114 HHS defines individually identifiable information as “information, including 
demographic data, that relates to: the individual’s past, present or future physical or 
mental health or condition, the provision of health care to the individual, or the 
past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to the individual, 
and that identifies the individual or for which there is a reasonable basis to believe 
can be used to identify the individual.”  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS, 
SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 4 (2003), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy 
summary.pdf.  However, HHS does not explain how to determine whether there is a 
reasonable basis to believe information can be used to identify the individual.  See id. 
 115 45 C.F.R. § 164.502. 
 116 Id. § 164.508. 
 117 However, “marketing” does not include marketing of services by the covered 
entities that are health-related.  Id. § 164.501.  Therefore, if a covered entity seeks to 
market health-related services to an individual, “the individual cannot opt out or re-
move herself from the mailing list.”  SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 87, at 383. 
 118 This includes employer disclosure used for employment decisions. SOLOVE, 
ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 383. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.508). 
 121 45 C.F.R. § 164.502.  This provision does not apply to disclosures to the indi-
vidual or for the treatment of the individual.  SOLOVE, ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra 
note 87, at 384. 
 122 45 C.F.R. § 164.302–.318 (2007). 
 123 Id. § 160.103. 
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four general requirements with which covered entities must comply: 
(1) to maintain “confidentiality, integrity, and availability” in their 
electronic health information, (2) to “protect the data against rea-
sonably anticipated threats to its security or integrity,” (3) to prevent 
“impermissible use or disclosure of the information,” and (4) to en-
sure employee compliance with the Security Rule.124  The Security 
Rule also requires covered entities to carry out assessments of their 
compliance with the rule, and to designate a “security official” to 
manage employee access to health information.125  A covered entity 
must be prepared to deal with a security breach and limit its effects.126  
Finally, the Security Rule establishes both physical and technical safe-
guards to prevent unauthorized access to protected health informa-
tion.127  Many of these physical and technical safeguards, however, are 
addressable and can be waived under various circumstances.128
The Final Privacy Rule has been criticized for lacking compre-
hensive authorization requirements.129  The Final Privacy Rule re-
quires an individual’s authorization for all uses of individually identi-
fiable information, unless used for “treatment, payment, or health 
care operations.”130  There are, however, various circumstances under 
which a healthcare provider can condition an individual’s treatment 
on such authorization.131  Conditioning authorization on treatment 
can, consequently, cause an ill patient to consent when she normally 
would not.  Additionally, although consent is required for the use 
and disclosure of protected health information by third parties for 
marketing purposes,132 a covered entity can use protected health in-
formation to market its own health-related products without authori-
 124 Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 339 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a) 
(2005)). 
 125 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. § 164.310–.312. 
 128 Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 339–40. 
 129 See June Mary Zekan Makdisi, Commercial Use of Protected Health Information Under 
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule: Reasonable Disclosure or Disguised Marketing?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 741 
(2004). 
 130 SOLOVE, ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 382 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 
164.508(a) (2006)). 
 131 Id.  Medical care can be conditioned on research-related disclosure and on the 
ability to use the information “to determine whether the individual is eligible for 
benefits or enrollment under a health plan, and for underwriting or risk rating de-
terminations.”  Id.  Also, payment for treatment can be conditioned on disclosure so 
long as disclosure is needed for the payment.  Id. 
 132 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3)(i) (2007). 
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zation.133  Thus, “a patient cannot opt out or remove herself from the 
mailing list.”134
In 2002, the Final Privacy Rule was amended to replace consent 
requirements with notice requirements for certain uses and disclo-
sures of protected health information.135  The notice provisions in the 
Final Privacy Rule are intended to educate patients about privacy 
rights and concerns, as well as the potential uses of their informa-
tion.136  Privacy notices are ineffective for many reasons.  First, privacy 
notices deprive the patient of the ability to discuss the use of her in-
formation with employees of the covered entity.137  Second, covered 
entities are not required to discuss in the notices any potential uses or 
disclosures specific to that individual entity.138  Finally, there is no re-
quirement that patients understand notices, thus covered entities of-
ten provide confusing notices to hinder their patients’ ability to com-
prehend the potential uses and disclosures.139  The result is that 
notice requirements do little to protect health information privacy.140
Furthermore, HIPAA’s Security Rule is inoperative against the 
various threats posed by those seeking to misappropriate personal 
data.141  The regulations in the Security Rule allow covered entities 
broad discretion in implementing their standards.142  For example, 
security regulations, which are not mandatory, can be modified or 
changed depending on the circumstances.143  As such, covered enti-
ties can choose to implement an “equivalent alternative measure” or 
not to implement the requirement at all if it is not “reasonable and 
appropriate.”144  Moreover, the regulations are vague and allow an en-
tity to determine what security measures “reasonably and appropri-
ately” meet the implementation standards.145  Additionally, covered 
 133 SOLOVE, ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 383 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 
164.501 (2006)). 
 134 Id. 
 135 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(a) (2007). 
 136 Marie C. Pollio, The Inadequacy of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule: The Plain Language No-
tice of Privacy Practices and Patient Understanding, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 579, 592–
93 (2004). 
 137 See Makdisi, supra note 129, at 759. 
 138 Id.  The notice requirement only requires entities to disclose “‘sufficiently de-
tailed’ descriptions of uses and disclosures that are permissible under the rule.”  Id. 
 139 See Pollio, supra note 136. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 336–37. 
 142 Id. at 337, 350–53. 
 143 Id. at 339–40. 
 144 Id. at 339–40, 350–53. 
 145 Id. 
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entities are directed to protect the information against “reasonably 
anticipated threats,” and therefore they are left to determine which 
threats can be reasonably anticipated.146  The broad discretion given 
to covered entities, as well as the ability to interpret vague regula-
tions, allows covered entities to decrease privacy protection.147
Finally, enforcement of the Privacy Rule is insufficient under 
HIPAA.  HIPAA allows for both civil and criminal penalties against an 
individual who knowingly obtains or discloses personally identifiable 
information.148  In addition, covered entities are liable for disclosures 
of protected information in violation of the Privacy Rule.149  However, 
the Secretary of HHS can only fine covered entities a maximum of 
$100 per violation, and not more than $25,000 per year for multiple 
identical violations.150  Criminal penalties do not apply at all in cases 
of willful misappropriation by violators who are neither covered enti-
ties or  employees of covered entities acting within the scope of their 
employment.151  Moreover, the Secretary of HHS rarely imposes civil 
penalties:152  although HHS received 19,420 complaints between April 
2003 and June 2006, it did not issue a single civil fine.153  Further, 
HIPAA does not provide for private causes of action, and HHS hear-
ings do not provide monetary damages as a form of relief for harmed 
individuals.154
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, as well as the other privacy protections 
presently available, will be unable to handle the increased threats to 
privacy in a national healthcare information infrastructure.155  The 
need for enhanced privacy and security protections is exacerbated by 
the computerization of health records and the increasing centraliza-
tion of databases.156  Therefore, any legislation that creates a national, 
unified healthcare information infrastructure must also include ade-
quate protection. 
 146 Pierre, supra note 12, at 550. 
 147 See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 350–53. 
 148 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2000). 
 149 45 C.F.R. § 160.400–.426 (2007). 
 150 Id. § 160.404. 
 151 Peter P. Swire, Justice Department Opinion Undermines Protection of Medical Privacy, 
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, June 7, 2005, http://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/2005/06/b743281.html. 
 152 Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 357–58. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 See id. at 384–86. 
 156 See id. 
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III. THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRONIC HEALTH  
RECORD INFRASTRUCTURE 
Several bills have been proposed in Congress to create a unified, 
national healthcare infrastructure.157  The central purposes of enact-
ing such legislation are to increase the quality of healthcare and to 
reduce costs associated with the storage and transmission of health 
information.158  These bills, which create a healthcare system more 
vulnerable to abuse and misappropriation of personal information, 
typically ignore the enhanced need for privacy protection; instead, 
they assume that the current scheme of protection will be suffi-
cient.159  This Part gives an overview of bills that exemplify the current 
approaches to creating a unified, national healthcare information in-
frastructure: the Wired for Health Care Quality Act, the Health In-
formation Technology Promotion Act of 2006, and the Independent 
Health Record Bank Act of 2006.  In addition, the bills discussed in 
this section are also likely to be passed in the near future.160
A. Wired for Health Care Quality Act 
The Wired for Health Care Quality Act (“Wired Act”) is in-
tended to stimulate the creation of a “nationwide, interoperable 
health information technology system to improve the quality and re-
duce the costs of health care in the United States.”161  This bill aims to 
achieve this goal through, among other things, establishing an Office 
 157 See Independent Health Record Bank Act of 2006, S. 3454, 109th Cong. 
(2006); Wired for Health Care Quality Act, S. 1418, 109th Cong. (2005); Health In-
formation Technology Promotion Act of 2006, H.R. 4157, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 158 See S. 3454 (“to improve the exchange of healthcare information through the 
use of new technology . . . [,]to use such records to build a nationwide health infor-
mation technology infrastructure, and to promote participation in health informa-
tion exchange by consumers through tax incentives”); S. 1418 (“To enhance the 
adoption of a nationwide interoperable health information technology system and to 
improve the quality and reduce the costs of health care in the United States.”); H.R. 
4157 (“To promote a better health information system.”). 
 159 These bills primarily rely on the HIPAA privacy regulations to prevent misuse 
of personal health information.  See infra Part II.A–C. 
 160 For example, the Wired for Health Care Quality Act has been passed by the 
Senate and, according to StateNet legislative forecasts, has a ninety-eight percent 
chance of being passed by a House of Representatives Committee and a ninety-six 
percent chance of being passed by the House of Representatives.  See Statenet, Legis-
lative Forecasts, S. 1418, Jan. 10, 2007, http://www.lexisnexis.com (go to “Federal 
Legal – U.S.”; then click “Legislative Histories and Materials”; then search “S. 1418” 
under “Congressional Bills Legislative Forecasts”).  Moreover, the Health Informa-
tion Promotion Act of 2005 was passed in the House of Representatives on July 27, 
2006.  See H. Roll No. 416 (2006). 
 161 S. 1418, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology 
(ONC) within the Office of the Secretary of HHS162 to coordinate the 
adoption of uniform electronic health information standards; estab-
lishing an American Health Information Collaborative to promulgate 
recommendations to be considered by various federal agencies;163 
and by providing grants to private entities for compliance with the 
bill.164  The Wired Act was introduced by Senator Enzi of Wyoming on 
July 18, 2005, and was passed by the Senate on November 17, 2005.165  
Although the bill includes provisions protecting private health in-
formation, they are insufficient for the uniform health information 
infrastructure that the bill attempts to establish. 
Initially, the bill defines various terms to provide guidance and 
elucidate the scope of its provisions.166  The bill defines the term 
“Health Care Provider” to include hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, 
home health entities, healthcare clinics, group practices, pharmacies, 
laboratories, physicians, and any other entities determined appropri-
ate by the Secretary of HHS.167  This definition is more specific than 
that in HIPAA168 and is broad in scope since the Secretary of HHS has 
the ability to include additional entities.169  Additionally, it is notable 
that the bill defines “Qualified Health Information Technology” as a 
“computerized system” that “protects the privacy and security of 
health information,” allows permitted access to electronic health in-
formation, “incorporates decision support to reduce medical errors,” 
and complies with standards under the bill.170
Thereafter, this bill provides that the ONC would be headed by a 
“National Coordinator” to be appointed by and report to the Secre-
tary of HHS.171  The duties of the ONC would entail coordinating fed-
eral agencies and private entities in developing a national health in-
formation infrastructure to protect patients’ individually identifiable 
information, improve the quality of healthcare, reduce medical er-
 162 Id. § 2902. 
 163 Id. § 2903. 
 164 Id. §§ 2904–2906. 
 165 Congressional Information Service, Bill Tracking Report, S. 1418, 2005, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com (go to “Federal Legal – U.S.”; then click “Legislative His-
tories and Materials”; then search “S. 1418” under “Bill Tracking Report-Current 
Congress”). 
 166 S. 1418 § 2901. 
 167 Id. § 2901(1). 
 168 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2007). 
 169 S. 1418 § 2901(1). 
 170 Id. § 2901(6). 
 171 Id. § 2902(a). 
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rors, reduce healthcare costs, facilitate the exchange of information 
between entities, and facilitate medical research.172  Moreover, the 
National Coordinator of the ONC would directly advise the Secretary 
of HHS and the President.173  The ONC will also be allowed to re-
quest federal agencies to assign their employees to the office for assis-
tance in achieving its goals.174
Next, the bill would establish the American Health Information 
Collaborative (AHIC), a quasi-public organization that will serve as a 
forum for discussing issues related to establishing and implementing 
an interoperable healthcare infrastructure and for “recommend[ing] 
. . . standards for the electronic exchange of health[care] informa-
tion.”175  The AHIC would be composed of an even distribution of 
representatives from “consumer or patient organizations,” healthcare 
providers, health insurance plans, third-party payors, information 
technology vendors, privacy and security organizations, and purchas-
ers or employers.176  Moreover, the representatives would serve for a 
maximum of two years.177  The AHIC would be responsible for sub-
mitting annual policy recommendations to increase system efficiency 
and security.178  Thereafter, HHS and other federal agencies would 
review these recommendations and determine whether they should 
be implemented by the federal government.179  These regulations 
would only govern federal agencies and would be entirely voluntary 
for private entities.180
The Wired Act includes many provisions aimed at protecting in-
dividually identifiable health information from wrongful use and dis-
closure.181  However, there are several reasons why this bill lacks ade-
quate privacy protection.  The main deficiency is that the regulations 
would be mandatory only for federal agencies.182  Regulation of the 
private sector is premised on the belief that private entities will volun-
tarily abide by the standards set forth by HHS and the AHIC.183  How-
ever, it is naïve to expect private entities to voluntarily incur the sub-
 172 Id. § 2902(b)(1)–(9). 
 173 Id. § 2902(c). 
 174 Id. § 2902(d). 
 175 S. 1418 § 2903(a)(3). 
 176 Id. § 2903(b). 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. § 2903(c)–(d). 
 179 Id. § 2903(e). 
 180 Id. § 2903(h). 
 181 See S. 1418 § 2903(h). 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
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stantial costs of purchasing new technology and implementing ad-
ministrative standards.184  Moreover, as has been shown in previous 
Parts of this Comment, allowing private industry to regulate itself 
typically results in lenient standards and a lack of adequate protec-
tion.185 Thus, this bill is as limited in protecting information in the 
private sector as is the Privacy Act of 1974.  Moreover, the Wired Act’s 
attempt to create a seamless, uniform infrastructure for the storage 
and transmission of electronic health information will be hindered 
because it fails to apply the regulations to private industry.  The result 
would be a uniform, national federal agency infrastructure, with vast 
differences between public and private standards.  Consequently, the 
bill’s ability to protect private information would be frustrated, since 
electronic health information that is highly guarded by a federal 
agency may be misappropriated when it is transferred to a private en-
tity.  It is unlikely that this system would allay public fears of inappro-
priate use of health information that cause patients to withhold in-
formation from practitioners.186  Therefore, to be effective, the Wired 
Act must make its regulations mandatory for private entities. 
B. Health Information Technology Promotion Act of 2006 
The Health Information Technology Promotion Act of 2006 
(HITPA) was introduced on October 27, 2005, by Representative 
Johnson of Connecticut to “promote a better health information sys-
tem.”187  The bill was subsequently passed by the House of Represen-
tatives.188  HITPA requires standards to be promulgated by the federal 
government regarding the adoption and implementation of im-
proved technology to create a uniform, national health information 
infrastructure.189  However, the bill would establish few privacy safe-
guards and is insufficient to protect individuals’ private information 
from misappropriation. 
 184 The Wired Act allows for federal grants to healthcare providers for implement-
ing the regulations and purchasing new technology resulting from the AHIC’s rec-
ommendations.  Id. § 2905.  However, to receive these grants, healthcare providers 
must meet various requirements and must also spend one dollar on implementation 
and new technology for every three dollars in government grants.  Id.  Therefore, 
even in the event that a healthcare provider obtains a government grant, it must still 
voluntarily choose to pay large sums of money to implement these standards. 
 185 See supra Part II.E. 
 186 See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text. 
 187 See Health Information Technology Promotion Act of 2006, H.R. 4157, 109th 
Cong. (2005). 
 188 H. Roll No. 416 (2006). 
 189 See H.R. 4157 § 103. 
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HITPA delineates a paradigm for the creation of a unified, na-
tional interoperable health information infrastructure similar to that 
detailed in the Wired Act.190  HITPA would establish the Office of the 
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology for essen-
tially the same purposes as described above.191  Additionally, this bill 
would require the National Coordinator to advise the Office of Man-
agement and Budget on health information issues and to be the 
“promoter of health information technology in medically under-
served communities.”192  Further, the bill would require the American 
Health Information Community to submit a report on the state of the 
health information infrastructure and to make recommendations.193  
The bill recommends that measures should be taken to establish the 
American Health Information Community as a more “permanent ad-
visory and facilitation entity.”194
The bill further delineates the process by which the National 
Coordinator, working with the American Health Information Com-
munity, would promulgate guidelines to promote a national health-
care infrastructure.195  The National Coordinator must first produce a 
“strategic plan” with a schedule for analyzing and endorsing “core in-
teroperability guidelines” for “significant use cases.”196  A “core inter-
operability guideline” is defined as “a guideline to improve and pro-
mote the interoperability of health information technology” that “the 
National Coordinator determines is essential and necessary.”197  
Moreover, a “significant use case” is “a category (as specified by the 
National Coordinator) that identifies a significant use or purpose for 
the interoperability of health information technology” including pur-
poses such as transmitting laboratory information and health re-
cords.198  The National Coordinator would then, consistent with the 
schedule, endorse certain core interoperability guidelines.199  Subse-
quently, these guidelines would be sent to the President, who must 
ensure compliance by federal agencies that broadly collect or submit 
 190 Compare H.R. 4157, with Wired for Health Care Quality Act, S. 1418, 109th 
Cong. (2005). 
 191 H.R. 4157 § 101. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. § 102. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. § 103. 
 196 Id. 
 197 H.R. 4157 § 103. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
MCMAHON_FINALV2 4/11/2008  10:59:23 AM 
2008] COMMENT 809 
 
health information.200  Beyond this, however, adherence to the guide-
lines would be entirely voluntary for federal agencies and private en-
tities.201
HITPA also includes provisions for updating standards for elec-
tronic exchanges, providing incentives for physicians to implement 
new technology, and conducting studies on various aspects of health 
information technology.202  The bill would establish a method by 
which standard-setting organizations may attain expedited implemen-
tation of upgrades or additions to data transmission standards.203  
Standard-setting organizations would be able to notify the Secretary 
of HHS that they are upgrading or improving their codes or formats 
for transmitting health information, and the Secretary would then 
publish a notice in the Federal Register,204 and allow the public to 
comment on the proposal.205  Next, the Committee on Vital Health 
Statistics would hold a hearing, which would include testimony from 
the public.206  The Committee would then deliver recommendations 
to the Secretary regarding adoption of the upgrade or improve-
ment.207  Finally, the Secretary would determine whether these 
changes should be implemented.208  This allows for expedited im-
plementation of the newest and most advanced standards for the 
transmission of health-related data.209  Additionally, HITPA would 
provide safe-harbor provisions to anti-kickback civil and criminal 
penalties and exemptions from physician referral limitations “for 
[the] provision of health information technology and training ser-
vices” to encourage physicians to adopt new technology.210  Moreover, 
the bill would require studies on the impact of health information 
technology in certain areas of healthcare and the likelihood that cer-
tain changes to the healthcare system will be successful.211  Among 
other things, these studies would examine the need for unification of 
 200 Id.  Federal agencies broadly collecting and submitting health information 
must be in compliance with these guidelines within three years of their endorsement 
by the National Coordinator.  Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 See id. §§ 201–407 (2005). 
 203 H.R. 4157 § 201. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 H.R. 4157 § 201. 
 210 Id. §§ 301–302. 
 211 Id. §§ 401–407. 
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state laws,212 the ability to integrate health information technology in 
home healthcare,213 and the methods through which to use health in-
formation technology to manage chronic diseases.214  This combina-
tion of provisions seems to be aimed toward encouraging physicians 
and healthcare providers to adopt technology that is current and ade-
quately suited to the needs of the healthcare industry. 
HITPA cannot be expected to realistically induce the creation of 
a unified, interoperable healthcare system with proper security and 
privacy protections.  Although the bill does mention maintaining pri-
vacy and security in health information, it does little to ensure that, if 
enacted, privacy and security regulations will be promulgated.215  The 
bill focuses almost entirely on improving efficiency in the healthcare 
industry without significantly considering health information privacy 
and security concerns.216  The bill never mentions any specific privacy 
or security measures to counteract the increased threats incident to a 
unified, national health information infrastructure. 
Moreover, the scope of any privacy regulations would be ex-
tremely limited.  The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of 
HHS would only be applied to selected federal agencies through the 
actions of the President.217  Further, these agencies would have three 
years to comply with such regulations.218  It is absurd to believe that 
this three-year lag-time will not circumvent the bill’s attempt to en-
sure the use of the most current technology through expedited en-
dorsement of improvements to data transmission standards.219  As 
mentioned above in the analysis of the Wired Act,220 it is also nonsen-
sical to expect private industry to expend considerable resources on 
voluntary privacy and security regulations.  Therefore, any privacy or 
security regulations promulgated pursuant to this bill would not be 
applied to adequately protect the privacy of sensitive health informa-
tion.  Consequently, this bill would not increase efficiency in the 
healthcare system by reducing the amount of information withheld 
 212 Id. § 401. 
 213 Id. § 402. 
 214 Id. § 407. 
 215 See H.R. 4157 §§ 101–102. 
 216 Id. § 101.  The Act lists providing for the “confidentiality and security of indi-
vidually identifiable health information” eighth on a list of thirteen goals of a “Na-
tionwide Interoperable Health Information Technology Infrastructure.”  Id. 
 217 Id. § 103. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. § 201. 
 220 See supra Part III.A. 
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by members of the public from medical practitioners due to fears of 
misappropriation. 
C. Independent Health Record Bank Act of 2006 
Introduced on June 6, 2006, by Senator Sam Brownback of Kan-
sas, the Independent Health Record Bank Act of 2006 (IHRBA) 
would establish and utilize a unique system of independent health re-
cord banks  to create a national healthcare infrastructure.221  This bill 
would also encourage participation by individuals, healthcare provid-
ers, and employers through a series of tax incentives222 and through 
health record banks sharing their revenue.223  A few purposes of this 
health information infrastructure are to improve healthcare quality, 
to promote disease prevention and management of chronic illnesses, 
to ensure that medical information is available for decision making, 
to increase the efficiency and reduce the cost of healthcare, and to 
ensure confidentiality of individually identifiable information.224
Within a year of Congressional enactment of this bill, the Secre-
tary of Commerce must promulgate standards for “the establishment 
and certification of independent health record banks.”225  Record 
banks would hold lifetime electronic health records for their mem-
bers, and would be interconnected to form a “national health infor-
mation network.”226  Moreover, these health records “may contain 
health plan and debit card functionality.”227  Record banks would be 
treated as covered entities under HIPAA, and may carry out health-
care clearinghouse activities.228  Additionally, IHRBA would require 
record banks to be non-profit entities,229 and not deny membership to 
any individual.230
Record banks would be able to finance their activities in various 
ways.  First, record banks could charge healthcare entities and indi-
vidual account holders fees for using the bank.231  Second, they could 
sell non-identifiable and partially identifiable health information to 
 221 Independent Health Record Bank Act of 2006, S. 3454, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 222 Id. § 4(a)(4)–(5), (e)(3). 
 223 Id. § 4(e)(2). 
 224 Id. § 2. 
 225 Id. § 4. 
 226 Id. 
 227 S. 3454 § 4(a). 
 228 Id. §§ 4(b), 5. 
 229 Id. § 4(b). 
 230 Id. § 4(c). 
 231 Id. § 4(e). 
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research facilities.232  Finally, they could generate revenue through 
“any other activities determined appropriate by the Secretary [of 
Commerce].”233  However, a record bank would have to share any 
revenue that it accumulates with account holders, and may share its 
revenue with healthcare providers and payers.234
IHRBA would limit the disclosures of health information that 
record banks may make.235  Generally, a record bank could only dis-
close an individual’s independent health record with the prior con-
sent of the individual.236  Moreover, a record bank would have to 
comply with the provisions of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.237  However, 
there is an exception to the consent requirement for emergency 
situations.238  A record bank could allow healthcare providers to ac-
cess “a limited, authenticated data set concerning an individual for 
emergency response purposes” during an emergency room visit, 
without prior consent from the individual.239  In addition, when sell-
ing health information, a record bank may only disclose an individ-
ual’s non-identifiable or partially identifiable health information 
upon meeting several requirements.240  The record bank and the in-
dividual must agree to any such sale.241
IHRBA would afford individual consumers certain rights regard-
ing their independent health record.242  The individual would main-
tain ownership over his or her complete health record, and would 
have the right to review it at any time.243  Further, the individual 
would be able to add information to his or her health record, and 
could seek to amend information in his or her record according to 
standards to be prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce.244  How-
ever, the healthcare entity “shall serve as the custodian of . . . infor-
mation that has been added by such entity to the health record of an 
individual.”245
 232 Id. 
 233 S. 3454 § 4(e). 
 234 Id. 
 235 See id. §§ 4(d), 6. 
 236 Id. § 6(a). 
 237 Id. § 6(d). 
 238 Id. § 6(c)(2). 
 239 S. 3454 § 6(c)(2). 
 240 Id. § 6(b)(1)–(7). 
 241 Id. § 6(b)(1). 
 242 Id. § 4(d)(1). 
 243 Id.  The individual can review the contents of his or her health record “at any 
time during the normal business operating hours of the bank.”  Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 S. 3454 § 4(d)(2). 
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IHRBA includes several incentives to encourage participation in 
the health record bank system by individuals, employers, and health-
care entities.  As mentioned above, the bill would require record 
banks to share any revenue resulting from the sale of health informa-
tion with its members.246  A record bank could also share this revenue 
with healthcare providers.247  The bill would make this even more lu-
crative by exempting the revenue from taxable income under the In-
ternal Revenue Code.248  Thus, individuals and healthcare providers 
would contribute more information to electronic health records to 
make them as valuable as possible.249  Additionally, IHRBA would 
amend the Internal Revenue Code to allow employers a tax credit for 
up to fifty dollars per employee for any investments made to maintain 
that employee’s independent health record.250  This would encourage 
employer and employee participation in independent health record 
banks.251
Finally, IHRBA includes measures to assure compliance with the 
bill and its regulations.  First, IHRBA includes provisions for regula-
tory oversight of record banks.252  The bill would require the Secre-
tary of Commerce to “develop a program to certify entities to operate 
independent health record banks,” to track economic activity of re-
cord banks, and to establish an “interagency council” to audit record 
banks.253  The interagency counsel would be responsible for auditing 
record banks and recommending privacy and security protections.254  
These protections would include record banks notifying individuals 
when their privacy is breached, implementing security measures to 
restrict access to information, and analyzing the risk of a security 
breach.255  Second, IHRBA would require states to establish a state 
agency to address complaints by state residents pertaining to a record 
bank.256  Moreover, record banks would have to provide these state 
agencies with information regarding the record bank’s policies and 
regarding its use and storage of information.257  Third, IHRBA would 
 246 Id. § 4(e). 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. § 4(a)(5). 
 250 Id. § 10. 
 251 S. 3454 § 4(a)(4). 
 252 Id. § 8. 
 253 Id. § 8(a). 
 254 Id. § 8(b). 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. § 7(b). 
 257 S. 3454 § 7(b). 
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attempt to ensure compliance by making civil and criminal penalties 
available for wrongful disclosure by a record bank.258  IHRBA would 
do this by applying HIPAA civil and criminal penalties259 to record 
banks.260  Finally, IHRBA would subject record banks’ transmission 
and use of data to all applicable existing federal and state privacy and 
security protections.261
IHRBA commodifies personal health information on a scale 
never before attempted in the United States.  This bill seeks to estab-
lish record banks throughout the United States,262 and would give in-
dividuals a property right in their health information.263  Such a sys-
tem could greatly increase efficiency in the healthcare system while 
protecting privacy.  This type of system, however, raises various con-
cerns regarding its effectiveness and privacy.  For one thing, com-
mentators have criticized granting a privacy right in personal infor-
mation.264  Moreover, the increasing value of electronic health 
records augments the incentives for misappropriation.  Finally, reli-
ance on the HIPAA Privacy Rule would be grossly inadequate under 
this regime.  HIPAA allows a healthcare provider to condition treat-
ment of an individual on that individual’s authorizing the healthcare 
provider to disclose the individual’s medical information to research 
facilities.265  Thus, a healthcare provider would be able to sell the in-
formation directly to a research facility and effectively cut out the re-
cord bank middle-man.266  This would result in a loss of revenue to 
record banks and individuals,267 which would negate the incentives 
for individual and healthcare provider participation in record 
banks.268  IHRBA would be successful only if it includes additional pri-
 258 Id. § 9. 
 259 42. U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2003). 
 260 S. 3454 § 9. 
 261 Id. § 7(a). 
 262 Id. § 2.  The purpose of the Act is to create a “nationwide health information 
technology network, which implies that the record banks will be established 
throughout the nation.”  Id. 
 263 Id. § 4(d)(1)(a). 
 264 See infra Part IV (discussing the use of a property right in one’s personal health 
information). 
 265 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(4). 
 266 Compare id. (explaining that HIPAA can condition treatment on patient au-
thorization for research related disclosure), with S. 3454 §§ 4(e)(b), 6(b) (allowing 
banks to generate revenue through the sale of non-identifiable and partially identifi-
able information to third parties for research). 
 267 See S. 3454 §§ 4(e)(b), 6(b). 
 268 Id. § 4(e). 
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vacy regulations and security protections to ensure that all personal 
health information flows through the record banks securely. 
IV. SOLUTION 
A uniform, national health information infrastructure must em-
ploy a combination of methods to protect the privacy of personal 
health information.  A variety of methods are available for Congress 
to implement in its legislation.269  Substantially all of these methods, 
however, have been criticized as being flawed in one way or another.  
Thus, with the ever-increasing need for privacy protection, a solution 
exists in employing a variety of these safeguards to provide layers of 
protection, with each layer guarding against the inadequacy of other 
layers. 
The basis for a novel privacy protection paradigm can be the 
recognition of a property right in one’s own health information.  Al-
though the commoditization of health information as a property 
right has often been criticized, there are solutions to the problems 
inherent in such commoditization.  Consequently, applying these so-
lutions allows the benefits of such a system to outweigh the negative 
consequences. 
First, it has been said that free alienability hinders the effective-
ness of using a property right to protect information privacy.270  The 
right of a property owner to freely transfer property rights to third 
parties is a fundamental aspect of property law.271  Thus, by granting a 
healthcare entity a right to use one’s propertized health information, 
it is assumed that the individual is also granting the healthcare entity 
a right to transfer the information to third parties for uses to which 
the individual might not have originally agreed.272  Second, it has 
been claimed that the commoditization of information will result in 
information market failure, which will cause people to trade away too 
much personal information.273  Thus, it is claimed that utilizing prop-
erty rights in personal information will increase trading in personal 
information, and as a result, privacy will be reduced.274  Finally, critics 
 269 These methods include property rights, contractual protection, common law 
or statutory causes of action, and criminal penalties.  See infra Part IV. 
 270 Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1137–
47 (2000). 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 
2076–84 (2004). 
 274 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423–28 (2000). 
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argue that recognizing property rights in personal information is 
contrary to a public benefit that exists from privacy protection.275  
Creating a property right in personal information has been described 
as “anathema” and as “morally obnoxious.”276  Moreover, it has been 
said that propertizing personal information “may make no more 
sense . . . than . . . to commodify voting rights.”277  Although there has 
been much criticism of propertizing personal information, there are 
significant benefits to utilizing property rights to protect such infor-
mation.278
The main benefit of creating a property right in one’s personal 
information is that it will shift bargaining power to the individual, as 
opposed to the information collector.  A common feature of current 
privacy protection is that it relies on liability rules.279  Under a liability 
rule, privacy is invaded, followed by some type of legal recourse, and 
thereafter, the privacy invader pays a price for obtaining the informa-
tion.280  Under a property scheme, however, the owner of a property 
right is able to negotiate the sale of that person’s information.281  
Moreover, the pre-sale negotiation pursuant to a property regime al-
lows the individual to determine the value of the individual’s infor-
mation.  Therefore, the value of one’s privacy will not be determined 
by a data collector, court, or legislative body as in a liability regime.282  
Although such a system could lead to personal information becoming 
under-valued and sold at too low of a price, it would be possible for 
individuals to form collective organizations to determine the appro-
priate value of their members’ information and negotiate with infor-
mation gathering entities on behalf of a large group of individuals. 
Additional benefits of a property regime include forcing busi-
nesses to internalize externalities associated with data collection as 
well as property rights running with the property.  Requiring busi-
nesses to internalize the costs associated with information gathering 
leads to more prudent decision-making regarding the collection and 
use of personal information.283  Therefore, the propertization of data 
may lead to a reduction in the overall amount of data being col-
 275 Schwartz, supra note 273, at 2084–90. 
 276 Samuelson, supra note 270, at 1143. 
 277 Id. 
 278 See infra notes 279–85 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of using 
property rights to protect personal information). 
 279 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.2, at 279–80 (2006). 
 280 See id. 
 281 See id. 
 282 See id. 
 283 McClurg, supra note 28, at 91–92. 
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lected.284  Propertization will also result in individuals receiving a pe-
cuniary benefit in exchange for the use of their personal information.  
Additionally, limitations on property rights will run with the property 
interest, and therefore, protection will apply to third parties.285
The problems caused by free alienability inherent in a property-
based privacy protection regime may be answered with a somewhat 
obvious solution: restricting alienability.  Although privacy critics ar-
gue that free alienability is a fundamental principle in privacy law and 
therefore unavoidably hinders utilization of property rights to protect 
privacy,286 restrictions on alienability are equally fundamental aspects 
of intellectual property.287  Paul Schwartz, a leading privacy advocate, 
compares limited alienability of an information property right to the 
successful restrictions on alienability allowed in modern copyright 
law.288  Correspondingly, Schwartz proposes a “model of propertized 
personal information” which relies on “hybrid inalienability.”289  This 
model “unpack[s]” the “bundle of sticks” commonly associated with a 
property right and puts limits on the rights of use and transferability 
in the property that “follow[] personal information through down-
stream transfers and limit[] the negative effects that result from ‘one-
shot’ permission to all personal data trade.”290  Therefore, legislation 
creating a uniform national healthcare infrastructure will be able to 
adequately restrict alienability, assuming healthcare entities comply 
with the applicable statutes and regulations. 
The advent of a health information property regime facilitates, 
and increases the efficacy of, the second “layer” of health information 
privacy protection: safeguarding privacy through contract.291  Tradi-
tionally, the formation of a contract includes two or more parties 
bargaining to exchange consideration, making offers and counterof-
fers, and subsequently agreeing to and accepting the terms of the 
contract.292  Ideally, then, the use of contracts to protect privacy 
 284 Id. 
 285 See notes 291–303 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of contract-
based privacy protections). 
 286 Schwartz, supra note 273, at 2091.  Free alienability “is considered by many to 
be an inevitable aspect of property.”  Id. 
 287 Id. at 2092; see also Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for Information Law and Policy, 
82 OR. L. REV. 695, 729 (2003). 
 288 Schwartz, supra note 273, at 2092. 
 289 Id. at 2094. 
 290 Id. at 2094–96. 
 291 See infra notes 292–93 and accompanying text (discussing the use of property 
as consideration). 
 292 CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN 
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 1–161 (5th ed. 2003). 
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should allow the individual and the entity seeking to use the informa-
tion to bargain and come to an agreement on the terms of the con-
tract.  Thus, using a property right as consideration, an individual 
should be able to tailor an entity’s use of the property to suit his or 
her needs, and will not agree to unsuitable terms.  However, data col-
lecting entities typically use adhesion contracts, leaving little or no 
opportunity for bargaining.293  Many healthcare entities already use 
confusing language in their privacy notices, causing patients to be 
unaware of their rights and the entity’s potential uses of their per-
sonal information.294  Consequently, information-gathering entities 
effectively coerce individuals to consent to unfair terms.295  Moreover, 
many information gatherers include provisions enabling the entities 
to change the terms in their privacy policies at random.296  Therefore, 
many argue that legislatures must adopt default rules in information 
privacy contracts, typically utilizing opt-in requirements in order to 
deviate from the default.297  Using default rules will shield unsuspect-
ing individuals from releasing their rights unwillingly.  Consequently, 
they will restore an individual’s ability to bargain for favorable con-
tract terms.298
Additionally, when an individual uses the law of contracts to pro-
tect privacy, the extent of the protection afforded by the contract is 
limited to enforcement against those parties who are in privity of con-
tract with the individual.299  Thus, a third party cannot be sued under 
contract law for appropriating data given as consideration pursuant 
to a contract.300  For example, a data collecting entity could freely 
transfer the rights granted to it pursuant to a contract to a third 
party, and the original party to the contract would have no rights 
against that third party.  However, if a property right is recognized in 
personal information, then third parties would not be immune from 
suit from the original “owners” due to the fundamental principle that 
 293 Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 
1265 (1998). 
 294 See Pollio, supra note 136, at 593. 
 295 See Kang, supra note 293, at 1265. 
 296 Schwartz, supra note 273, at 2080. 
 297 See Kang, supra note 293, at 1270–72; Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Per-
sonal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2416–17 (1996); 
Schwartz, supra note 273, at 2100–06. 
 298 See Murphy, supra note 297, at 2404–16 (analyzing empirical data showing the 
efficiency and lowered transaction costs associated with using contractual default 
rules to protect information privacy). 
 299 KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 292, at 494. 
 300 See id. 
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property rights run with the property interest.301  This means that 
property rights “can be enforced against subsequent transferees of 
other rights in the [personal information].”302  Moreover, third par-
ties will not be allowed an interest in property granted by a second 
party without the authority to make such a grant.303  By creating a 
property right, the first “layer” of protection under this Comment’s 
proposed paradigm partially safeguards against the inadequacies of 
contractual privacy protection. 
Nevertheless, it is naïve to conclude that a property right in per-
sonal information is sufficient to contain such information within the 
realm of contractually bound second parties.304  Consequently, tort 
liability for misappropriation must serve as a third “layer” of protec-
tion.  Without a private cause of action for misappropriation, there is 
little to stop entities from wrongfully obtaining information from in-
dividuals, as well as from second parties.  For example, as mentioned 
in the foregoing paragraph, a secondary party cannot grant to a third 
party a greater property interest than that which it owns.  Thus, if a 
second party disregards a restriction on alienability and subsequently 
transfers its property interest to a third party, the third party’s interest 
is voided.  This works well for property interests in land or other tan-
gible property, but it disintegrates when dealing with intangible 
property, such as personal information.305  Consequently, attaching 
civil liability to third-party misappropriation is necessary to deter 
prohibited use and acquisition. 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, tort litigation may increase the ef-
ficiency of this privacy protection scheme.  First, although transaction 
costs associated with complex litigation may commonly reduce effi-
ciency, those transaction costs, in addition to any ensuing civil dam-
ages, have the effect of deterring misappropriation.306  Second, allow-
 301 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The 
Numerous Clauses Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 374 
(2002). 
 302 Id. 
 303 See id. at 375. 
 304 See McClurg, supra note 28, at 96–97. 
 305 The reason is that the holder of intangible, intellectual property may freely 
alienate such property while retaining the entire, original interest.  See Lipton, supra 
note 287, at 728–36.  It is very difficult to retake possession of private information 
once it has been disclosed because it is intangible. See id.  Indeed, a third party 
wrongfully obtaining personal information might not abide by contractual restric-
tions on use that bound the second party, since the third party is not in privity with 
the original owner.  See supra notes 291–303 and accompanying text (discussing the 
limitations of contractual privacy protection). 
 306 McClurg, supra note 28, at 101. 
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ing injured parties to seek compensation assures that motivated 
plaintiffs will aggressively pursue claims against the entities that 
caused their harm.307  Plaintiffs seeking “personal justice and redress” 
are in a better position for success than, for example, members of a 
government regulatory agency.308  Third, civil discovery pursuant to a 
lawsuit is more likely to yield information pertaining to the violative 
practices of an entity than an investigation by a federal agency.309  
This is evidenced by the current dearth of knowledge about the se-
cretive practices of information gathering entities.310  Finally, assum-
ing the privacy claims would meet the requirements for class action 
certification, having a private cause of action would allow plaintiffs to 
aggregate their claims.  Consequently, individual harms that are too 
minor to be worth the costs of litigation may be aggregated to make 
litigation profitable.311  Thus, under a tort liability scheme, entities 
are deterred from harming vast numbers of individuals in such a mi-
nor way as to avoid liability.  Further, unlike other methods of privacy 
protection, creating a private cause of action is relatively easy and in-
 307 Id. at 100. 
 308 Id. 
[L]egislation would probably not be effective in controlling informa-
tion privacy unless it created a strong incentive for someone to enforce 
it. . . . If congressional committees and regulatory agencies are the 
sheriff, tort plaintiffs and their lawyers are the bounty hunters. People 
who have a personal stake in the outcome have a much stronger incen-
tive to influence the outcome . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 309 Id. at 99. 
     Conventional wisdom says that legislative and agency bodies are bet-
ter venues for collecting information about social policy issues.  At least 
in the context of consumer data, that view may be wrong.  Studying 
transcripts of the FTC’s major “workshop” on consumer data fails to 
answer the most important questions regarding data mining and profil-
ing.  Most notably, not a single sample of a consumer data profile was 
produced at the workshop, despite vigorous attempts by a leading pri-
vacy advocate to obtain profile samples in advance.  The workshop 
transcript reflects amiability among the participants that is ill-suited to 
the goal of meaningful fact finding.  For the most part, these agency 
investigators pitched softball questions that industry representatives 
safely bunted with vague answers. 
     Civil discovery in the U.S. is an extremely liberal process that allows 
broad inquiries in an attempt to ferret out relevant facts.  The civil dis-
covery process, backed up by the power of court orders, including the 
potential for sanctions, can be a much more potent method of fact in-
vestigation than government hearings. 
 Id. (citations omitted). 
 310 McClurg, supra note 28, at 98–99. 
 311 WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW 
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 351–52 (2003). 
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expensive.312  Legislation may create a private cause of action by 
merely including a provision stating that one shall exist.  Moreover, 
courts are free to create a common law cause of action to deal with 
misappropriation.313  Hence, a private cause of action should be cre-
ated to supplement any legislation creating a unified national health 
information infrastructure. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The right to health information privacy, deemed “sacred” by the 
Supreme Court,314 is being whittled away by legislation containing lit-
tle or no privacy protection.315  It has been shown that misappropria-
tion and wrongful disclosure of private health information can have 
devastating consequences.316  Nevertheless, Congress has focused al-
most exclusively on increasing efficiency in healthcare, ignoring the 
potential harm caused by inadequate privacy protection. 
This Comment, while recognizing that no conventional method 
of privacy protection is flawless, proposes a regime that relies on 
three layers of protection, so that the inadequacies of each is coun-
teracted by the strengths of the others.  Consequently, this paradigm 
ensures adequate protection in a national, unified health information 
infrastructure. 
 
 312 McClurg, supra note 28, at 97–98. 
 313 Id. 
 314 Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
 315 See supra Part III.A–C. 
 316 See supra Part II.A. 
